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PROMOTING IMPARTIALITY OF INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATORS THROUGH CHINESE
CRIMINAL LAW: ARBITRATION BY “PERVERSION OF LAW”
Deng Ruiping. a1 Duan Xiaosong aa1
ABSTRACT
This essay is prompted by a recent Chinese criminal provision
governing the impartiality of arbitration. The goal of the essay is to
critically examine the new law and to put forward some proposals for
reform, which could be employed to resolve the tension that exists
between arbitrator impartiality and deference to arbitration. Although the
new provision appears to be a rule to eliminate the abuse of arbitral
power, it may raise more questions than it resolves. This essay explores
the problems and undertakes a comparative analysis of the U.S. provision
as well as an analysis of some cultural and traditional elements
influencing the new crime in China. From the author’s point of view, the
concerns could be better met by fine-tuning the rule rather than
abandoning it in order to keep a balance between the previous two
conflicting values. A mechanism of judicial interpretation, borrowing
some U.S. experience, has been proposed. It could well suit China’s
needs because the benefits of arbitration can be retained without
sacrificing the impartiality of arbitration.
I. INTRODUCTION
China’s accession into the World Trade Organization (WTO) in
December 2001 and the growing globalization of the world economy has
greatly increased international trade and investment. In the wake of the
modern explosion of international trade and transnational investment,
arbitration has become “the accepted method for resolving international
business disputes.”1
Parties from different nations tend to seek arbitration in order to
prevent an abundance of jurisdictional problems. 2 Arbitration has also
become a preferred method for foreign parties to resolve their legal
disputes in China, largely due to the distrust these parties have of
Chinese courts.3


a1

Professor of Law, Southwest University of Political Science and Law (China).
Law lecturer, Southwest University (China); PhD candidate, Southwest University of Political
Science and Law (China).
1
YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT G. GARTH, DEALING IN VIRTUE: INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF A TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 6 (1996).
2
Frederick Brown & Catherine A. Rogers, The Role of Arbitration in Resolving Transnational
Disputes: A Survey of Trends in the PRC, 15 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 329, 333 (1997).
3
See Deborah Chow, Development of China's Legal System Will Strengthen Its Mediation
Programs, 3 CARDOZO ONLINE J. CONFL. RESOL. 4 (2002).
aa1

SUMMER 2014

Promoting Impartiality

With its acceptance and popularization, international commercial
arbitration now plays a very important role in private conflicts
settlement. Arbitration provides a neutral venue that aims at ensuring
procedural fairness for both parties, unlike litigation in the national
courts of one of the parties to a dispute.4 Arbitration permits parties from
two different countries to exercise a great deal of control over how a
dispute will be resolved.5 The parties are free to tailor the proceedings to
meet their needs. Specifically, parties can contract to govern all disputes
by a certain set of laws or procedures. 6 They decide the scope and
content of the arbitration, define its procedures, and choose the location
of the arbitration by specifying these stipulations in the arbitration
agreement. 7 Most importantly, parties have the power to select the
decision maker.8 This freedom to select the arbitrator is why arbitration
has been described as “hiring your own private judge.” 9 Arbitration
allows parties to not only realize procedural fairness, but also benefit
from the predictability to their disputes, lower attorney fees, more
privacy, and expert decision making. The finality of arbitration is another
advantage, which is often attractive for its speed and cost-effectiveness.
Particularly, with well-functioning international enforcement system
under the 1958 New York Convention,10 arbitral awards are often easier
to enforce than court judgments.11 The issue of arbitrator impartiality is,
therefore, critical to the development of arbitration rules and cannot be
ignored in the process of international private disputes resolution. The
legitimacy of international commercial arbitration relies, to a large
degree, upon the thoroughness of arbitration institutions and the
independence and impartiality of arbitrators.
While Chinese arbitration has seen remarkable progress in a
relatively short period, there are many problems remaining that need to
be addressed. The focus of this essay is criminal liability for biased
arbitrators. This essay is largely prompted by the codification of a new
crime: Arbitration by “Perversion of Law” (Wangfa Zhongcai Zui),
which has been provided in the Amendments to the Criminal Law of the
People’s Republic of China (VI)12 in 2006 and designed to punish biased
arbitrators for their wrongdoings. The goal of this essay is to critically
examine the legal regime of arbitrator impartiality in China, including


4

See Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 516 (1974).
DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 1, at 273.
6
See Scherk, 417 U.S. at 518.
7
See ALAN REDFERN & MARTIN HUNTER, LAW AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 5 (2d ed. 1991).
8
IAN R. MACNEIL ET AL., FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAW §3.2 (1st ed. 1995).
9
MARTIN DOMKE, DOMKE ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION §1:01 at 1 (3d ed. 2001).
10
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958,
21 U.S.T. 2517 [hereinafter New York Convention].
11
See Andrew T. Guzman, Capital Market Regulation in Developing Countries: A Proposal, 39
VA. J. INT'L L. 607, 632 (1999).
12
The Amendments to the Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China (VI) (Zhonghua
Renmin Gongheguo Xingfa Xiuzhengan) (liu) was promulgated and effective on Jun. 29, 2006. For
a relatively detailed description of the provision, see infra Part .
5
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this provision, and put forward some proposals for reform. Part II
provides a brief description of the framework of arbitration system in
China. Part III presents a background of Arbitration by “Perversion of
Law,” and examines the debate on the new law, compares it with some
provisions of the U.S. arbitration laws, and explores the relative Chinese
legal culture, tradition, and economic environment factors that underlie
criminal liability of arbitrators. Part IV gives evaluations from the
perspective of jurisprudence and offers some reform proposals on the
basis of borrowing some U.S. experience. Finally, Part V provides a
summary, along with some concluding remarks.
II. ARBITRATION SYSTEM IN CHINA
Arbitration in China was traditionally divided into two types:
domestic arbitration and foreign-related arbitration. The latter was also
called international arbitration, which was designed to handle disputes
arising from economic, trading, transportation, and maritime activities
involving a foreign element.13 In contrast, the former is labeled as having
jurisdiction over cases without foreign elements. Obviously, Chinese law
treated foreign-related and domestic arbitration separately.
Accordingly, domestic Arbitration Commissions in different regions
are established mainly for resolving domestic economic contract
disputes. As a matter of fact, there are --in theory-- at least several
arbitration mechanisms for domestic disputes. For instance, employment
disputes, intellectual right disputes, and securities disputes are not
arbitrated pursuant to voluntary agreement, but submitted to arbitration
because of particular laws. These do not fall within the scope of our
present discussion, since they are not commercial in nature and those
tribunals are more like administrative organs. This essay will primarily
focus on international commercial arbitration. The institutions for
handling international cases include China International Economic and
Trade Arbitration Commission (“CIETAC”) and China Maritime
Arbitration Commission (“CMAC”).14 The arbitration rules and practices
of CMAC are virtually identical to those of CIETAC, so foreign-related
arbitration can best be demonstrated by CIETAC. In accordance with its
rules, disputes arising between Chinese parties and/or parties from Hong
Kong, Macao or Taiwan, or between Chinese-foreign joint ventures and
Chinese parties, are within CIETAC’s jurisdiction.15


13

See 1995 Arbitration Law of the People's Republic of China, art. 65. [hereinafter Arbitration

Law].
14

China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission was first set up in 1954 by
the name of Foreign Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission, and China Maritime Arbitration
Commission in 1958 by the name of Maritime Arbitration Commission. Both are within China
Council for Promotion of International Trade. Arbitration Law sets forth a special chapter dealing
with their legal status in China's dispute resolution system. The history of CIETAC and their
arbitration rules are available online at http://www.cietac.org (last visited March 12, 2012).
15
See CIETAC Arbitration Rules, art. 3.
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CIETAC’s long-standing exclusive jurisdiction over foreign-related
disputes, however, was dramatically by State Council Notice,16 Article 3,
which provided that domestic Arbitration Commissions now had the
“power to accept foreign-related arbitrations when the parties have
agreed to submit disputes to such Arbitration Commissions.” 17
Additionally, according to the newly revised 2005 CIETAC Arbitration
Rules, CIETAC can also accept cases involving domestic disputes.18 This
allows cross pollinizing between foreign-related arbitration matters with
domestic Arbitration Commissions and domestic disputes with CIETAC.
Indeed, the ambiguity of these provisions appears to be the source of
conflicts.
Another notable distinction between domestic and foreign-related
arbitration is the different criterion of judicial review over arbitral
awards. The People’s Courts can review not only procedural issues but
also the legal reasoning supporting the domestic arbitral awards.19 As for
international arbitration, however, the courts are not allowed to consider
the legal merits to overturn an award. These courts can only scrutinize
the procedural issues,20 which is also in conformity with the New York
Convention. Similar provisions can be found in the Convention, of which
China became a member in 1987.21 The procedural review is certainly a
remarkable achievement, given the short history of the development of
China’s arbitration.
Generally speaking China’s international arbitral tribunals are
better established and more sophisticated, and it is important that they
remain distinct from domestic arbitral tribunals, which do not share
CIETAC’s reputation. 22 Empirical research has revealed that CIETAC
holds a leading position in terms of the caseload in China. In 2010,
CIETAC accepted 1,352 new cases in total, including 418 foreign-related
cases, accounting for 30.9 of the total caseload.23



16
The full name of the State Council Notice is “Circular of the General Office of the State
Council Regarding Several Issues Which Need to be Clarified in Relation to the Implementation of
the Arbitration Law of the People's Republic of China,” June 8, 1996.
17
Brown & Rogers, supra note 2, at 346.
18
CIETAC Rules, supra note 15, at art. 3.
19
If a party can prove that evidence on the basis of which the award was made had been forged,
or the other party withheld evidence sufficient enough to have an impact on the impartiality of
arbitration, he may submit an application for vacation of the award. See Arbitration Law, supra note
13, art. 58.
20
See 2008 Civil Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China, art. 258. [hereinafter Civil
Procedure Law].
21
See New York Convention, art. 5.
22
Brown & Rogers, supra note 2, at 329, 339.
23
See Foreign-related Arbitration Identified as Key Priority of Arbitration Services, CIETAC,
http://www.cietac.org/index/news/4772c81b4d672a7f001.cms (last visited Feb. 12, 2014).
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III. THE NEW CRIMINAL PROVISION OF ARBITRATION BY “PERVERSION
OF LAW”
On June 29, 2006, China’s legislature, the Standing Committee of the
National People’s Congress adopted and promulgated at its 22nd meeting
an important piece of law: The Amendments to the Criminal Law of the
People’s Republic of China (VI). The enactment imposed criminal
liability on the biased arbitrators by the recognition of a new crime:
Arbitration by “Perversion of Law,” which falls within the scope of
Dereliction of Duties of Judicial Personnel.
A. Background of the New “Perversion of Law” Criminal Provision
In order to guarantee the legitimacy of the arbitration process, the
arbitral institution must ensure the neutrality of the arbitrator. 24 Thus,
having a neutral and impartial arbitrator resolve commercial disputes
seems a fundamental goal in modern arbitration. In response to this,
states throughout the world enact laws to deal with the corruption in
arbitration. Surprisingly, Chinese legal policy pertaining to the partiality
of arbitration differs from those of western nations. Apart from vacatur
and refusal of implementation of an arbitral award, which may look
familiar to westerners, a recent provision in China’s criminal law
establishes criminal liability of biased arbitrators.
Chinese Arbitration Law, unlike its western counterparts, is
extremely young due to a limited history of arbitration in China.
Arbitration in China began in the 1980s under a policy of instituted
reform and openness to meet the needs of China’s rapid growing
economy. Being an import from the west, it is new to most Chinese
people. The purported legislative purpose of the new enactment is to
regulate arbitrators’ conducts and guarantee fairness and justice in the
course of arbitration, which was once considered a legal loophole.25 The
new crime is inserted after Article 399 of Criminal Law, which falls
within the category of crimes of dereliction of duty and is named Civil
and Administrative Judgment by “Perversion of Law.” The Criminal
Law became effective in 1997 while the new crime was proclaimed in
2006. Now that a judge could face a criminal penalty for a malevolent
ruling since enactment of the original criminal law nine years ago, why
should an arbitrator escape from a similar punishment? As arbitration
competes with litigation for status, some contend that an arbitrator
should be as liable as a judge is when bending the law.
In debating the bill that would later become the law, many arbitration
scholars openly objected to the inclusion of the new crime. They did so
because the arbitrator’s criminal liability is not in line with international


24

See Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Grabbert, 590 A.2d 88, 92 (R.I. 1991).
See Zhongqian Chen, Lun Wangfa Zhongcai Zui De Sheli Dangum [To Delay Setting up the
Crime of Distorting the Law to Arbitrate], 1 ZHONGCAI YANJIU [ARBITRATION STUDY] 2 (2006).
25
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practices. Nevertheless, it has been adopted and has become a new law.
Admittedly, it was the fear that the power of arbitrators could be
mishandled and justice could be threatened that prevailed over the
objections to the new crime and eventually formed a sound basis for the
new provision, because this worry is prominent particularly in the
context of China.
Unlike Western tradition of “rule of law,” China has a unique culture
often termed “rule of relationship (guanxi),” which is a sort of gift
economy that involves the “cultivation of personal networks of mutual
dependence and trust.”26 The “rule of guanxi,” also operative in Asian
societies, appears to make it challenging for parties to find a mutually
accepted “fair” arbitrator, and even the selection of an arbitral institution
problematic, because parties distrust each other. The question whether
the other party has “guanxi” with arbitrators highlights the significance
of the impartiality of the arbitrators deciding their disputes. This problem
is disconcerting, because it might lead to a cooling in commerce between
China and foreign nations and there might be fewer international
arbitration cases occurring. That is not the outcome that China would
presently like to encourage. Understandably, a more severe punishment
would be called for on a biased arbitrator.27
One unavoidable and significant consequence of the new provision
worth noting is the early intervention of the public power with
arbitration. Generally, there is a division of criminal cases in Chinese
criminal justice system based on the burden of proof, namely, cases of
public prosecution and private prosecution. The public prosecutors, also
known as a judicial authority like courts, are named Procuratorate and
obligated to prove before the court in the former cases whereas the
claimant himself should provide evidence of the wrongdoing of the
accused in the latter cases. Most of the crimes are public prosecution
cases and only a small number of them are private prosecution ones.28
However, a crime of dereliction of duty is a public prosecution case. In
other words, it is the Procuratorate instead of the claimant who should
bear the burden of proof. They should investigate and collect evidence
before bringing the case to the court. In such a case, not only the courts
but also the Procuratorate have been indirectly warranted the power of
substantial review of arbitral awards by the new enactment.



26
Carol A.G. Jones, Capitalism, Globalization and Rule of Law: An Alternative Trajectory of
Legal Change in China, 3 SOC. AND LEGAL STUD. 195, 197 (1994).
27
See Guoqiang Luo, Wangfa Shongcai Zui Sibian [Crime of Misuse of Law in Adjudication], 1
ZHONGGUO XINGSHIFA Zazhi [CRIMINAL SCIENCE] 71 (2009).
28
Cases of private prosecution include the following: (1) cases to be handled only upon
complaint; (2) cases for which the victims have evidence to prove that those are minor criminal
cases; and (3) cases for which the victims have evidence to prove that the defendants should be
investigated for criminal responsibility according to law because their acts have infringed upon the
victims personal or property rights, whereas, the public security organs or the People’s Procuratorate
do not investigate the criminal responsibility of the accused. See 1997 Criminal Procedure Law of
the People's Republic of China, art. 170.
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B. The Debate Surrounding the New Provision
1. The Anti-crime Arguments
Article XX of Amendment (VI) provides that an article be inserted
after Article 39929 of the Criminal Law as Article 399 (I):
Where anyone who undertakes the duties of arbitration
according to law intentionally goes against the facts and
law and makes any wrongful ruling in the process of
arbitration, he shall be sentenced to fixed-term
imprisonment of not more than three years or detention.
If the circumstances are extremely serious, he shall be
sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of not less than
three years but not more than seven years.
This simple paragraph raises a host of complicated questions, and
has incurred a lasting national debate.
Prior to the legislation, the issue of penal punishment upon a
biased arbitrator has been at the heart of the discussion and has received
a wide range of practical and academic attention. While the new crime
was an effort to fill the legal gap of liability for arbitrators, many
arbitration scholars have denounced that it seems to have fallen short of
its goal.30 The anti-crime arguments are mainly as follows:
First, one of the continuing debates is whether contract traits,
rather than judicature characteristics, form the cornerstone of, and
exercise pervading influence over, arbitration. It has been criticized that
the analogy of arbitration with litigation may be arbitrary and seems to
have an impressionistic flavor.31 A common objection to the new crime
is that it is against arbitration’s nature. It is important to understand that



29
Article 399 of the Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China (Zhonghua Renmin
Gongheguo Xingfa) provides that judicial personnel who act with partiality and defeat the ends of
justice and bend the law for the benefit of relatives or friends, subjecting to prosecution persons they
clearly know to be innocent or intentionally protecting from prosecution persons they clearly know
to be guilty, or, intentionally go against facts and laws in criminal trials to render judgments that
misuse the law, shall be sentenced to not more than five years of fixed-term imprisonment or
criminal detention, and when the circumstances are serious, “not less than five years and not more
than 10 years” of fixed-term imprisonment; and in exceptionally serious circumstances, not less than
10 years of fixed-term imprisonment. Whoever intentionally goes against facts and laws in civil and
administrative trials to render judgments that misuse the law, and when the circumstances are
serious, shall be sentenced to “not more than five years” of fixed-term imprisonment; and, in
exceptionally serious circumstances, “not less than five years and not more than 10 years” of fixedterm imprisonment. Judicial personnel who take bribes, bend the law, and commit the crimes
mentioned in the two preceding paragraphs, and meanwhile constituting the crimes mentioned in
Article 385 of this law, shall be convicted and punished in accordance with the stipulations for a
heavier penalty. See 1997 Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China, art. 399.
30
See Xiaohong Liu, Queding Zhongcaiyan Zeren Zhidu De Fail Sikao [Jurisprudence Analysis
of Establishment of Arbitrators’ Liability], 54 HUADONG ZHNGFA DAXUE XUEBAO [JOURNAL OF
EAST CHINA UNIVERSITY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND LAW] 89 (2007).
31
See Zhongqian Chen, Lun Wangfa Zhongcai Zui De Redning [Cognizance of Law-bending
Judgment Crime], 24 ZHONGCAI YANJIU [ARBITRATION STUDY] 76 (2011).
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arbitration is not litigation with another name. An arbitrator performs a
task that resembles that of a judge, yet there are critical differences
between judges and arbitrators. The latter charge fees from parties,
whereas the former, as state personnel, receive wages from state budget.
Further, arbitrators are experts chosen from the same industry in most
cases and sometimes are not required to possess any legal education.32
Rooted within market economics, disputants have chosen arbitration to
settle controversies for hundreds of years. As such, it is the participants
who shape the arbitration, which is then recognized by a state’s legal
system among various private dispute resolutions.33 The rationale behind
arbitration is the doctrine of party autonomy. In light of this doctrine, the
parties’ consent to address arbitral issues through arbitration should be so
respected and enforced that neither of the parties can initiate judicial
proceedings before the arbitration takes place. Opponents of the new law
also argue that the judicial value system should allow no intervention of
public power in the private domain when parties mutually agree to
exercise their autonomy to arbitrate. Under this view, arbitrators’
authority comes from the authorization of parties instead of a state
because the former have the natural right of self-regulation. Therefore,
the nature of arbitration should first be deemed as a product of contract
between the parties and the arbitrators other than a form of judicature,
and then as a legal service other than judicial power.34 This is particularly
important where one goal of international arbitration is to limit state
influence on the dispute resolution process between and among
international parties. Otherwise, the expected benefits of arbitration
would be dramatically reduced.35
Second, and more importantly, it is not clear that the new law is
workable. Some arbitrators show signs of bias, and others appear
objective. It is highly likely that in practice this provision will not
function as expected, because the language in Amendment (VI) offers
little guidance as to what particular conduct constitutes this crime.
Specifically, the first challenge is figuring out who is covered by the new
law. Although the person who commits the crime is referred to as
“anyone who undertakes the duties of arbitration according to law,” it is
far from clear as to who might be considered “anyone.” Without
exception, the description covers both arbitrators and any other personnel
working in arbitration commissions, 36 which causes some practical



32
See Lianbin Song, Wangfa Zhongcai Zui Pipan [A Critical Analysis of the Crime of
Deliberately Rendering an Arbitral Award in Violation of Law], 62 BEIJING ZHONGCAI
[ARBITRATION IN BEIJING] 27 (2007).
33
See Qianquan Xu, Wangfa Zhongcai Zui Zhi Pipan [A Criticism of Law-bending Arbitration],
3 GUANGXI MINZU XUEYUAN XUEBAO [JOURNAL OF GUANGXI UNIVERSITY FOR NATIONALITIES]
28 (2006).
34
Id.
35
See Song, supra note 32, at 36.
36
For example, “anyone” can also refer to the chairman of an arbitration commission in
accordance with the provision “Where the parties agree that an arbitration tribunal shall be
composed of three arbitrators, they shall each select or entrust the chairman of the arbitration
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difficulties. An arbitral award is often made based on majority opinions
of arbitrators and dissenters need not sign on the award. 37 Should an
arbitrator who disagrees and refuses to sign the award be included as
“anyone” if later the crime of Arbitration by “Perversion of Law” is
found? If he were the “anyone,” would that be fair?38
Moreover, with regard to defining “intentionally,” yet,” which is
another fundamental question, neither Amendment (VI) itself nor the
arbitration law provides detailed rules about how it should be
ascertained. By including “intentionally,” a “negligent” act may be
precluded from prosecution. But it is very difficult, if not impossible, to
draw a line between an arbitrator’s “intentional” disregard of law and a
“negligent” mistake in the process of handling a case, because the
intentions of an arbitrator cannot be cannot easily verified by a court. In
practice, what satisfies “intentionally” is subject to interpretation.39
Further, currently there is confusion about the expression “goes
against the facts and law.” At first blush, it indicates that where both the
two conditions of “goes against the facts” and “goes against the law” are
satisfied, the said crime exists. However, the new enactment keeps silent
when only one condition is fulfilled. As previously shown, both CIETAC
and a domestic Arbitration Commission have jurisdiction over
international or foreign-related disputes. Following international practice,
parties could often choose what law they want to govern interpretation
and enforcement of their agreement. Sometimes, in amicable arbitration
or ad hoc arbitration, no applicable law is selected and arbitrators are
empowered to disregard the strictures of legal rules in search of more
equitable resolutions to disputes.40 Therefore, to what specific law does it
refer? Suppose that the applicable law is a foreign law; do Chinese courts
have the competent jurisdiction to make a decision that the arbitral award
“goes against” a foreign law?41 Additionally, more confusion in respect
to the phrase “if the circumstances are extremely serious” would arise
because of its inherent ambiguity. The new enactment has been silent on
this crucial and controversial area. As such, it is extremely difficult to
use the mere provision in making a judgment as to the “circumstances”
that are “extremely serious.”42
Another problem with the new law is that it is inconsistent with
existing Chinese law, as well as international obligations. As previously
outlined, China adopted a “two-track” approach in judicial review of
arbitral awards, under which Chinese judicial organs are not permitted to


commission to appoint one arbitrator. The parties shall jointly select or entrust the chairman of the
arbitration commission to appoint the third arbitrator, who shall be the principal arbitrator.” See
1995 Arbitration Law of the People's Republic of China, art. 31.
37
Arbitration, art. 53 to 54.
38
See Chen, supra note 31, at 78.
39
See Song, supra note 32, at 29.
40
Catherine A. Rogers, Fit and Function in Legal Ethics: Developing a Code of Conduct for
International Arbitration, 23 MICH. J. INT'L L. 351, 352 (2002).
41
Song, supra note 32, at 27.
42
Id.
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review any of the legal merits or reasoning except procedural issues in
international arbitration. However, how can a court bring in a verdict of
Arbitration by “Perversion of Law” without substantial judicial review of
the arbitral award?43 Unfortunately, to judge if the crime exists, courts
have to require the arbitration panel to provide reasons justifying its
decision, despite the fact that arbitral awards are often rendered without
explanation of reasons and even without a complete record of
proceedings.44 Furthermore, as a domestic Arbitration Commission now
has jurisdiction over both domestic and foreign-related disputes, suppose
that an arbitrator of a domestic Arbitration Commission handles a
domestic case and a foreign-related case in the same manner. He then has
to face two different criterion of judicial review. What he might be held
criminally liable for under domestic criteria would be immune to penal
punishment under international criteria. 45 This, in turn, makes judicial
review act as a deterrent only to domestic arbitrators. Accordingly, a
responsible and capable arbitrator would be overly cautious and
understandably reluctant to risk accepting appointment. As such, the
quality of arbitration may decline and eventually harm the development
of arbitration as well as the efforts of rule of law in China.
Lastly, Amendment (VI) has also been criticized as both underinclusive and over-inclusive. On the one hand, although the language of
the amendment is too vague and simplistic to provide any concrete
guidelines in practice, there is only a theoretical possibility that a biased
arbitrator would be caught and convicted of the crime. After all,
corruption occurs in more subtle ways and open partiality is very rare.
The new law is more like a moral announcement or a law in paper than a
mature legal provision.46 On the other hand, it has been opined that there
are already enough rules to prevent arbitrator misconduct. The existing
remedies include application for withdrawal and replacement of an
arbitrator, application for vacation of the award, denial of enforcement of
the award, notification of re-arbitrating by the tribunal, and rejection of
the application.47 And even penal punishment could sometimes be used.48



43
See Hui Huang, Lun Wangfa Zhongcai Zui Zhi “Wangfa” Xing [The “Perverting” Nature of
Law-bending Arbitration], 169 SICHUAN DAXUE XUEBAO [JOURNAL OF SICHUAN UNIVERSITY] 124
(2010).
44
A written arbitral award shall specify the arbitration claim, the facts of the dispute, the
grounds for the award, the result of the award, the apportionment of the arbitration costs, and the
date of the award. Where the parties agree not to specify the facts of the dispute and the grounds for
the award in a written arbitral award, they may do so. A written arbitral award shall be signed by the
arbitrators and affixed with the seal of the arbitration commission. Arbitrators with different
opinions on the arbitral award may or may not sign the award. See 1995 Arbitration Law of the
People's Republic of China, art. 54.
45
Huang, supra note 43, at 125.
46
Song, supra note 32, at 36.
47
According to Arbitration Law, arbitration shall be carried out independently and free from
interference by administrative authorities, social organizations or individuals; where an arbitrator has
privately met a party or agent or has accepted an invitation or gift from such party or agent, he must
withdraw and his name shall be removed from the list of arbitrators; where arbitrators demanded
and/or accepted bribes, practiced graft or made an arbitral award that perverted the law, a party may
submit an application for vacation of the award. See Arbitration Law, art.8, 34, 38. 58. Moreover,
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In addition, it is worth noting that the new provision, as a distinctive
Chinese characteristic, is not in conformity with the international trend of
minimal judicial intervention.49 Similar provisions can hardly be found in
most other jurisdictions.50
2. The Pro-crime Arguments
Despite such criticisms, however, many criminal academics and
practitioners support the use of penal punishment on arbitrators. The
Procuratorate, for example, have been strong advocates of the new law.
They believe that no arbitrator should misuse his power to go against
facts and laws intentionally because of the notion of basic justice, which
is accepted universally no matter how it manifests.51 The new provision
would encourage high standards of integrity and lasting confidence in the
process of arbitration. The pro-crime arguments focus mainly on the
following aspects.
As with most legal debates, the issue of appropriateness of penalty
could not be sensibly examined without taking account of a conduct’s
social harm. China has long accepted this concept, giving more
consideration to the maintenance of social stability. Though highly
abstract, social harm is widely believed to be a core factor in devising a
law.52 On the one hand, an arbitral award is a final law-bound decision
equal to and maybe even more than that of a judicial decision, because it
is not subject to any appellate review. Arbitrators are completely free to
use their own personal knowledge in making the decision and are not
obliged to follow rules of evidence. Further, they are not required to give
express reasons for their decisions. On the other hand, courts are
generally deferential to an arbitral award and will not review the legal
merits to overturn it. While international arbitration develops as an
alternative dispute resolution along with the fear that foreign courts will
be biased in favor of local parties, its own impartiality cannot be
guaranteed. Those features leave the door open to abuse of arbitral
powers. In reality, arbitrators do have an incentive to render an unfair
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award because of the inherently self-interested nature of their decisions.
In that case, the partiality in arbitration could result in actual injury to the
complaining party and social justice would then be greatly harmed. By
stipulating the new crime, the law establishes what might be a credible
penalty regime imposed on a biased arbitrator, even though the cases
involving such conduct are relatively rare. It should be kept in mind that
“no crime without law making it so; no penalty without law making it
so” is a generally accepted principle of criminal law in most
jurisdictions.53 In response to the attack of redundancy of crimes, it is a
normal phenomenon that various crimes might compete and overlap.
However, that fact alone does not justify that there is no need for the new
crime.54
Another powerful counterargument is that besides the feature of
contract, arbitration also has another very important trait—quasijudicature—that helps make arbitration an attractive alternative to
litigation. This is best illustrated by the enforceability of an arbitral
award. Notably, it is an indisputable fact that arbitration resembles
litigation and remains intimately dependent on a national legal system.
Arbitrators are expected to act like judges who will provide justice to all
parties and guarantee them a fair hearing and a just award. More
importantly, arbitral awards, like judgments, are expected to be enforced
by national courts. 55 Thus, arbitration cannot be viewed merely as a
contract of legal services. Rather, it might be viewed as a power to make
a decision, which is indeed a part of an authority of judicature.56 Even if
parties’ intent to arbitrate should be respected in accordance with the
doctrine of party autonomy, it does not mean the arbitrator’s freedom to
bend the law should be respected too.57 While an arbitrator is a private
judge, a “judge” means that he is empowered to make a decision in
accordance with the law instead of going against the law. Undoubtedly,
parties’ do not consent to select a biased arbitrator and accept an arbitral
ruling by “perversion of law.”58
Next, even after acknowledging that the new provision is far from
developed, especially in its workability, the solution of simply
abrogating the new provision because of these shortcomings still appears
insensible. Lack of clarity should not be used as an excuse to deny the
necessity of the new provision.59 This concern could be better met by
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providing detailed rules to make it more workable rather than
abandoning the law. Additionally, with the help of judicial interpretation,
it could be more feasible and function more efficiently. Even assuming a
skeptical attitude towards the workability, it is reasonable to make an
exception and argue that the new provision will take an active role in
response to corruption in arbitration. Having established this law, the
court then could proceed to articulate an arbitrator’s liability in case of
his “perversion of law.” This change is a necessary step to improve the
appearance of partiality. Along with other legislation, the new enactment
has greatly enhanced China’s arbitration legal framework. 60 Frankly,
most crimes in Chinese criminal law are virtually non-enforceable
without further detailed rules.61
While it has been attacked for being contrary to international
practice, some contend that with decreasing the possibility of arbitral
power misuse, arbitration would benefit from the more severe
punishment. Additionally, it would ensure the healthy development of
arbitration and make China an attractive place for international
arbitration. 62 Furthermore, the new provision is desirable because it
meets the present stage of economic development of China. 63 Due to
underdevelopment of market economics and lack of the tradition of rule
of law, some Asian countries and districts like Japan, South Korea, and
Taiwan, have undergone a period characterized by more intervention of
mandatory laws with many aspects of social lives. A better development
of arbitration in those regions appears to be achieved through the support
of public power. They do not have to wait hundreds of years to
“naturally” raise the professional quality of arbitrators, establish a code
of arbitrator ethics, cultivate social trust in arbitration and repeat the
same mistakes and then correct them.64 In consideration of the social and
cultural similarity, it is also inadequate for China, currently, to follow the
same route of regulating arbitrator conduct as the west. The development
of arbitration can be promoted by the means of legislation, with
advantages from both common law and civil law systems being fully
used.65
Additionally, qualification of arbitrators is a key factor in
introducing the new law. Building a highly qualified team of arbitrators
is extremely difficult, given the short history of China’s market
economy. Unlike judges, arbitrators are not required to obtain any legal
training or pass any professional examinations before performing their
duties. Arbitral awards are sometimes rendered in favor of the party with
guanxi. However, it is certain that the situation would be much worse if
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there were not such a strict stipulation pertaining to the impartiality of
arbitrators.66
Finally, the fact that it took the legislators nine years to decide and to
create this law illustrates the necessity of criminalizing the conduct in
China.67 There is an increasing concern about the judicial corruption in
China. Now that a judge who acts with bias and bends the law can
assume penal punishment, why should a “private judge” be immune from
the same punishment? Since the professional judicial personnel are likely
to bend the law, why could not similar things happen to an arbitrator?
The new enactment embodies the principle that similar cases should be
dealt with similarly, which serves as a good prevention of the crime.68
C. Situating the Chinese Debate with the U.S. Experience on
Impartiality of Arbitrators
In sharp contrast to the current Chinese approach, which has minimal
provisions concerning arbitrator neutrality but a sharply punitive criminal
statute if there is bias “by perversion of law,” the U.S. approach has been
quite different. The analysis of arbitral impartiality in the U.S. relies on
analogy to judicial impartiality. Arbitrators in America are viewed in the
same light as judges and therefore must be held to the same standards of
impartiality as are imposed on judges.69 Additionally, a judge does not
have to assume civil or criminal liability for his wrong ruling in
litigation, and 70 neither does an arbitrator. Instead, the usual remedies
for unfairness on the part of an arbitrator include removal or replacement
of the disqualified arbitrator and vacation or impeachment of the award.
Similarly, the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) provides that an
arbitration award may be vacated “[w]here there [is] evident partiality or
corruption in the arbitrators, or either of them.” 71 To show “evident
partiality” in an arbitrator under the FAA, a party must either establish
specific facts indicating actual bias toward or against a party or show that
the arbitrator failed to disclose to the parties information that creates a
reasonable impression of bias.72 “This rule of arbitration and this canon
of judicial ethics rest on the premise that any tribunal permitted by law to
try cases and controversies not only must be unbiased but also must
avoid even the appearance of bias.”73 Nevertheless, “arbitration differs
from adjudication, among many other ways, because the ‘appearance of
partiality’ ground of disqualification for judges does not apply to
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arbitrators; only evident partiality, not appearances or risks, spoils an
award.”74
The U.S. Supreme Court has established four factors to determine if
a claimant has demonstrated evident partiality: “(1) the extent and
character of the personal interest, pecuniary or otherwise, of the
arbitrator in the proceeding, (2) the directness of the relationship between
the arbitrator and the party he or she is alleged to favor, (3) the
connection of that relationship to the arbitration, and (4) the proximity in
time between the relationship and the arbitration proceeding.” When
considering each factor, the court should determine whether the asserted
bias is direct, definite, and capable of demonstration rather than remote,
uncertain, or speculative, and whether the facts are sufficient to indicate
the arbitrator’s improper motives. 75 More recently, the Supreme Court
expressed disfavor with any notion that the slightest pecuniary interest
would constitute evident partiality76, thus suggesting that this standard is
fairly high.
Additionally, only neutral arbitrators are held to this standard. As
mentioned above, many arbitral tribunals have a three-arbitrator panel.
Under the common arrangement, each party designates one arbitrator
(party arbitrators or non-neutral arbitrators) and the two select a third
(neutral arbitrator). Party arbitrators are not expected to be as impartial as
neutral arbitrators. “Evident partiality” is a ground for vacatur only for
neutral arbitrators, because non-neutral arbitrators, unless otherwise
agreed, serve as representatives of the parties appointing them.77 In other
words, absent overt corruption or misconduct in the arbitration itself, no
arbitrator appointed by a party may be challenged on the ground of his
relationship to that party. 78 Furthermore, a party with constructive
knowledge of the potential partiality of an arbitrator may waive its right
to challenge an arbitration award based on evident partiality if it fails to
object to the arbitrator’s appointment or the arbitrator’s failure to make
disclosures until after an award is issued.79
Vacatur of arbitration award is appropriate under FAA only in
exceedingly narrow circumstances, such as where arbitrators are partial
or corrupt, or where an arbitration panel manifestly disregards, rather
than merely erroneously interprets, the law.80 An arbitration award can
only be vacated on one of four exclusive statutory grounds: “ (1)
corruption, fraud, or misconduct in procuring the award; (2) partiality of
an arbitrator appointed as a neutral; (3) an overstepping of the arbitrators
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of their authority or such imperfect execution of it that a final and
definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made; or (4) a
failure to follow the procedure of this Arbitration Code, unless the party
applying to vacate the award continued with the arbitration with notice of
this failure and without objection.”81 A financial interest in the outcome
of the arbitration or a direct relationship with a party are relevant
considerations when determining whether an arbitrator's relationship is
material to the arbitration at issue, for purposes of determining whether
failure to disclose a conflict of interest warrants vacatur of award under
FAA.82
It has been widely recognized that an arbitrator has the obligation to
disclose to the parties any interest or bias and failing to do so might
constitute “evident partiality”, though no specific provision pertaining to
disclosure has been found in U.S. laws. In addition, peculiar industry
practices and norms are considered in determining whether an arbitration
award is subject to vacatur, particularly with an arbitrator’s full and
timely disclosures regarding business relationships with the parties. 83
Under the evident partiality standard, arbitrators are held to a less strict
disclosure regime than the appearance of partiality standard that applies
to judges. 84 According to the Revised Uniform Arbitration Act, an
arbitrator has a continuing duty to disclose any fact he learns after his
appointment if a reasonable person would consider it likely to affect the
impartiality of the arbitrator. 85 The arbitrator also has the duty of
disqualifying himself or herself upon discovering sufficient reasons for
such action, in order not to prejudice an effective arbitration. This selfdisqualification of the arbitrator is required under the Rules of the
American Arbitration Association (AAA) which require any person
appointed or to be appointed as an arbitrator to disclose to the AAA any
circumstance likely to give rise to justifiable doubt as to the arbitrator’s
impartiality or independence, including any bias or any financial or
personal interest in the result of the arbitration or any past or present
relationships with the parties or their representatives.86
Although an arbitrator must disclose any bias or interest, arbitrators
are not required to explain the arbitration award and their silence cannot
be used to infer grounds for vacating an award.87 A party seeking vacatur
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of an arbitration award on grounds of evident partiality has the burden of
proof, and, to meet this burden, he or she must demonstrate that a
reasonable person would conclude that an arbitrator was partial to the
other party to the arbitration.88 To be specific, the party who alleges that
an arbitration award was procured by corruption, fraud, or other undue
means must: “(1) establish the fraud by clear and convincing evidence;
(2) demonstrate that the fraud was not discoverable by the exercise of
due diligence before or during the arbitration hearing; and (3)
demonstrate that the fraud was materially related to an issue in the
arbitration.”89
Generally, the merits of the controversy between the parties to
arbitration cannot be challenged as an attack for the allegation of evident
partiality or corruption by the losing party. Largely for this reason, the
merits of an award are not subject to judicial review. Courts will not
review the validity of the arbitrator’s reasoning, and may not review the
sufficiency of the evidence supporting an arbitrator’s award. Thus, the
general rule is that an arbitrator’s decision cannot be reviewed for errors
of fact or law. In addition, the legislature has reduced the risk to the
parties by providing for judicial review only in circumstances involving
serious problems with the award itself, or with the fairness of the
arbitration process.90
This U.S. approach works for a well-developed legal system with a
strong rule of law model, but it is less clear that it would work well for
China’s arbitration system. Perhaps it is because the Chinese
understanding of corruption, fraud or misconduct is still evolving, which
may be why the Chinese statute is ambiguous. In addition, arbitration
awards have a stronger history of publication in the West than in China,
which makes it more difficult to hide or disguise a distortion of law. To
fully understand why Chinese approach of criminal statute was a rational
choice, we need to step back and place the arbitration process in the
context of the history of the Chinese legal system.
Stepping Back: Exploring the “Perversion of Law” Provision in
Light of the Historical Development of Chinese Legal System without a
fundamental knowledge of the Chinese legal system, a plain reading of
the provision of the new enactment may lead the reader to make a
misconceived attempt to analogize and extrapolate from his own
ethnocentric experiences to a quite distinct legal system. The
contemporary Chinese legal system is still heavily burdened and
influenced by traditional forces. This section undertakes an analysis of
some cultural and traditional elements influencing the new crime,
demonstrating some probable reasons for the new statute from the
perspective of history. This author argues that a criminal law-oriented
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legal culture, a civil law tradition, and an underdevelopment of market
economy in China contribute to the penal liability of arbitrators.
1. Chinese Legal Culture
A law must operate in a cultural context and be impacted by the
culture, yet that culture is in turn affected by the operation of law. 91
Arbitration by “Perversion of Law” has become a new crime due to
various social and cultural elements. Chinese legal culture, which differs
greatly from those of western countries, is at the heart of the issue. The
basic philosophy underlying traditional Chinese law is the belief of
harmony, which leads officials to deal with legal cases in terms of a
“situation to be restored” rather than in terms of “individuals seeking
justice”. Under this theory, two prominent characteristics have to be
mentioned in China’s ancient legal system. One is that all legislation was
criminal law, named Xing. Thus, in the eyes of ancient Chinese people,
laws for a long period of time have just meant one thing —punishment.
The other is that a teaching of morality called Li, which was traditionally
considered the highest form of regulation, was used in coordination with
Xing. Li includes a set of moral standards of conduct appropriate to
persons of varying status in different situations. If ordinary people could
be taught Li by precept, example and symbolic ritual, there would have
been no need for anything like Xing, which was seen as inferior to Li.
But, for those rebellious people who failed to make their behavior
conform to Li, punishments had to be prescribed in the form of a code of
penal law.
While the codification of laws was undertaken a long time ago in
China, there was no division of public laws and private laws in the early
codes. In ancient China, commercial disputes were very rare. The codes
were all public laws (criminal laws) by nature even though they were
commonly applied in private fields. The criminal law-favored and
morality-oriented tradition was also the mainspring of China’s ancient
legal system and machinery of law enforcement. Of the two, the criminal
law favor is probably the most important element because in Chinese
history, the “law” has long been believed to be criminal law. The
criminal law-favored tradition embodies the need for the convenience of
state rule at that time that results in centralization of state power. The
more prevalent the idea of concentration of power is in a society, the
more developed the criminal law system. 92 Where the notion of
centralization of state power is so dominated that the state and collective
interests surpass those of individuals, any infringement of private rights
can be interpreted as damage to social order and state interests. Rather,
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the state and the people will clearly express their attitude: revenge and
punishment. This attitude best explains why the partiality of arbitrators
becomes a social concern and why a country will eventually choose a
criminal punishment to address it. Therefore, all the laws the society
needs are criminal laws, or at least criminalized laws.93
However, this changed at the dawn of the 20th century, when a legal
reform (Legal Reform of Qing Dynasty) aimed at imitating western legal
systems took place. This reform effectively separated the civil laws from
criminal laws. However, it is still difficult to fill the gaps of different
legal cultures that originated from different legal traditions. Law is
generally thought to be a merely passive instrument whose operation can
either be promoted or impeded by culture. Thus, the ancient Chinese
legal tradition continues to impact the legal process in at least two
aspects. First, lawmakers are inclined to employ criminal laws to
maintain stability in large areas of social life. This feature, as a
distinctive Chinese characteristic, is still strong and might remain so in
the foreseeable future. Meanwhile, criminal provisions often contain
more moral statements than particular legal rules. Secondly, due to a lack
of tradition of private rule of law, the average person has less trust in
private rights, and is accustomed to turning to intervention of public
power for their sense of security.94
The distinction between eastern and western legal cultures seems
much more pronounced than the distinctions among different western
legal cultures. The categories and functions of laws vary even more
across cultures. Considering those diametrically opposed traditions, the
Chinese arbitration system is within the larger framework of China’s
national legal system and evolves along with the development of that
system. With no western rule of law tradition on one side, and a strong
impact of local criminal law-favored and morality-oriented tradition on
the other side, it appears that the penal liability of arbitrators is not only
desirable in the eyes of Chinese authority, but also welcomed by the
people. This of course is not surprising given the ambivalent value of
criminal law for modern China.
2. Civil Law Tradition
Following the Legal Reform of the Qing Dynasty, a significant
development of modern law in China was characterized by the
introduction of a Civil Code. This code borrowed a lot from the Japanese
and German models and today has a direct offspring in Taiwan. It has
only been more than a few decades since China began creating
systematic codes. Legal ideas were directly taken from one legal system
to another. Legislators were content with formalism and law-making. For
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this reason, it is often believed that the contemporary Chinese legal
system is attributed to the influence of the civil law family. Traditionally,
civil law countries were hostile to arbitration. Arbitration by “Perversion
of Law” has to some extent, followed this tradition.
One of the enduring characteristics of the differences between
common and civil law system is with respect to what is law. It is well
known that in common law countries, case law is commonly believed to
be the main source of the law. However, in civil law countries, the law is
statutory. The latter jurisdictions have put emphasis on legislation.
Furthermore, people find themselves with more interest in statute making
than dispute resolution. Thus, civil law judges are described as
“mechanically appl[ying] legislative provisions to given fact
situations.”95 This feature embodies the deductive method of civil law
systems, which is distinct from the inductive method of common law.
Some jurisdictions, such as China, even look at the deductive method
that has become popular and introduce it into their domestic legal
systems. Because arbitration is a significant part of the justice system on
which Chinese society relies, it is not surprising that the legislature
believes that it is in the public interest to establish a generally accepted
enactment to regulate arbitration. The overconfidence in the power of
legislation can also be a fruitful ground for an explanation of the new
enactment in China, regardless of the significant gap between enacted
rules (the law-in-the-books) and actual practice (the law-in-action).
Another noteworthy aspect is the influence of judges in different
legal systems. Civil law adjudicators should mechanically follow the law
(statutes), rather than “create” the law. Parties in a civil law system go to
court to resolve disputes where statutory law is not interpreted, but is
rather applied by judges to determine the outcome of cases. 96 While
continental judges have broad managerial powers, they are expected to
apply the law in an almost mechanical way, remaining a controlled
instrument of the legislature.97 This system leaves no room for judges’
participation in the creation or transformation of legal rules. Conversely,
in the United States it is readily acknowledged that parties seek to
achieve changes in the law through the legal system, and that judges
have the ability through statutory interpretation to make laws. The task of
a common law judge is to evaluate counsel’s competing arguments about
hyper-factual analogies and subtle distinctions in prior decisional law.98
By following the precedents, judges can make a breakthrough to create
new rules when necessary. They have express law-making and policy-
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creating functions. 99 In addition, many civil law judges consider it an
important part of their job to help the parties reach an amicable
settlement. Judges in common law systems are comparatively passive in
their fact-finding role. Notably, civil law judges do have more chances to
engage in “perversion of law.” Without doubt, their impartiality duties do
not and cannot be the same as those of common law judges. A common
law judge is not accountable for his decision (even unfair decisions) and
for any losses incurred by the parties. Likewise, neither is an arbitrator,
who is deemed a quasi-judge. Decisions that deviate from the law would
not be considered an inappropriate violation of impartiality obligations in
common law system. How can a U.S. judge be charged with bending the
law since he has the power to make the law? Therefore, crimes like
adjudicators’ perversion of law appear to be found only in Asian
countries with a civil law tradition.
3. Market Economy
Arbitration is widely believed to be an inherently private, contractdrawer system of dispute resolution, and a product of a market economy.
This perception is supported to some extent by the history of arbitration
and the degree of parties’ control in shaping arbitration proceedings.
However, it cannot be assumed that arbitration in China has the similar
background of market economy as that in the west. China’s commercial
environment is significantly different. Chinese arbitration lacks its
purported popularity, custom, and ability of private governance from the
incomplete development of market economy. While China is
transitioning from a centrally planned economy to a market-oriented
economy, the latter is extremely young, having only been around since
the 1990s. The underdevelopment of market economy and the socialist
central planning-featured impact provide arbitration with less soil for
growth. It is important to note that the development of arbitration in
China is not due to the maturity of market economy and party autonomy,
but instead is a result of government promotion. Although Arbitration
Commissions are proclaimed to be administratively independent from
both the local and national governmental units in accordance with
Arbitration Law,100 they are far from being truly independent. Most of
them are to some extent linked to various administrative authorities in
that their existence depends on the manner and degree to which they are
supported by the local Chinese governments. 101 Arbitrators are thus
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viewed as government officials, and the standard of arbitrator
impartiality is naturally expected to be the same as that of judges.
Furthermore, there is no such thing in China as a code of ethics for
arbitrators. Therefore, regulation of arbitrators can hardly be realized
through a code of ethics or through market rules such as competition, and
reputation. On the contrary, it has to depend upon public power and
criminal provisions. Moreover, the criminal provisions do not completely
replace a code of ethics for arbitrators. Though there is a system in place
that regulates arbitration in China, it will still take much longer to perfect
its arbitration laws.
IV. EVALUATIONS ON THE NEW CRIME AND PROPOSALS FOR REFORM
A. Evaluations on the New Crime
Arbitration is efficient, inexpensive, and harmonious. Parties have
long regarded international commercial arbitration as an effective choiceof-forum and mechanism for resolving international commercial
disputes. It provides parties with specific advantages over traditional
litigation. Foremost, arbitration alleviates most of the jurisdictional
disputes amongst parties. 102 However, the Chinese legislative attitude
towards arbitration, as shown in the enactment, seems to be unfriendly to
arbitrators, as it discourages the deference to arbitration. Arbitration is by
its nature quasi-private and procedurally more flexible than judicial
systems. It provides greater certainty and a higher level of expertise than
the court-based system. This flexibility allows arbitrators to work more
quickly and efficiently, which is very important for time-sensitive
commercial arrangements. However, with this flexibility it is possible for
arbitrators to betray the trust of the parties and rule against the provision
of the law. Because arbitral awards are final, binding, and enforceable in
the same manner as court judgments, and because wide discretion is left
to the parties, their attorneys, and the arbitrators to fashion the procedure
as they wish without any judicial interference, this system could cause an
infringement of legal interests and rights. 103 Furthermore, due to the
universal acceptance of the New York Convention, which provides for
the confirmation of arbitration awards in member nations, parties cannot
resolve their disputes in multiple forums if one party contests the
decision of the arbitral tribunal.104
From an economic perspective, the issue of quality of service is
critical in that a common criterion of quality needs to be set out for the
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healthy development of a market. If it is lower than the standard of the
market, and the service provider cannot be expelled, the results would be
a decrease of quality of service and a collapse of market in the end.105 In
terms of arbitrator impartiality, it is reasonable and fair to make a biased
arbitrator, the provider of poor quality service, assume some liability.
It has been recognized that arbitration rulings must be subject to
some judicial review to ensure that the arbitral proceeding has operated
within the state’s legal framework. This supports a conclusion that the
judicial authority should act as a watchdog in supervising arbitrators and
providing a remedy when necessary. Adjudicators should act for the
common good. Regardless of which laws govern, the rule that the bias or
partiality of an arbitrator, whom the parties expected to be neutral, is
good cause for invalidating the arbitration award appears to be
universally accepted.106
To ensure impartiality, it is necessary for China to legislate on the
serious misconduct of arbitrators. However, Chinese legislation
addresses the concern with a more severe means than may be necessary,
criminal liability. Clearly, the lawmakers made an inappropriate analogy
between the role of an arbitrator and that of a judge, in which an
arbitrator is virtually identical to a judge. They probably believe that all
adjudicators should be neutral when making a decision and arbitrators
should behave as impartially as judges. This belief confuses the
distinction between arbitration and litigation. It is helpful to begin by
noting that although the arbitrator performs a task that resembles that of a
judge, there are critical differences between judges and arbitrators.
Despite the resemblance between arbitration proceedings and court
proceedings, it is important to keep in mind that the former is the result
of a private contract while the latter arises from the state’s authority to
resolve disputes and to compel compliance. As private actors, arbitrators
perform their function for private gain.107 The basic role of arbitration is
a sort of legal services, which is at essence market participants’ selfregulating and an unofficial dispute resolution system without state
intervention.108 It has been opined that if it had been necessary to create a
new crime in regulating an arbitrator’s misconduct, it would be better to
be one like fraud or infringement upon property on the basis of contract,
rather than a crime of dereliction of duty.109 In fact, blindly transplanting
the crime of Judicial Personnel by Perversion of Law and applying it to
arbitrators was an ineffective method to achieve the social goals. This,
along with the provision of establishment of arbitration commissions, is
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difficult to make people believe that arbitration in China is truly
independent.110
The lawmakers also seem to think that an imperfect system is better
than no system. However, a lack of market rules, industry regulation, and
a code of arbitrator ethics and civil liability, makes the cure worse than
the illness. The core issue here is not whether the biased arbitrator should
be liable or not, but instead the issue is how and to what extent should
the arbitrator be liable. Any change of institution, especially in the form
of criminal law, must be prudential even though confidence in criminal
law is one of the most rooted political faiths in China. Ensuring the
enforcement of standards and providing meaningful remedies to those
injured by arbitral misconduct is equally as important as articulating
standards of conduct and professional ethics for arbitrators and provider
institutions.111 There are some market forces that discourage arbitrator
misconduct. Arbitrators wishing to attract business would have an
incentive to develop a reputation of impartiality. Many are obedient to
the law, even though there is no formal punishment and no benefit can be
obtained from breaking the law. Arbitrators’ actions are restricted by
custom, conscience, and such concerns like caring for one’s reputation.
Additionally, Arbitrators’ consider the net profit by deducting the cost
and risks of law breaking or being sympathetic to the victims. Thus,
arbitration develops along with the market economy, and market rules
seem to function effectively and play a more important role than legal
rules.112
While it appears a good objection that the criminal punishment is
inconsistent with the international practice, it fails to further explain why
similar crimes can rarely be found in most other jurisdictions. A criminal
penalty results in harsh consequences to the individual, to his or her
family, and indirectly to society as a whole. A state should avoid misuse
of a criminal penalty or should tailor the penalty to avoid excessive,
ineffective, or costly penalties. In a modern society, with the focus being
moved on citizens’ rights and interests, civil laws play a more important
role than criminal laws. Criminal laws should be cautiously applied
because of the higher social cost. The basic idea is that the law-makers
should make attempts to procure maximum social benefits—effective
prevention and control of misconducts at the expense of minimum social
pay—use of less or none of criminal penalty. Even though it is submitted
that China should address the issue of arbitrator impartiality, it cannot
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put this inclination to an unlimited extreme without consideration of the
potential harms associated with the penal punishment. This ultimately
reflects a national cognition of the nature of arbitration and the extent of
transfer of public power to the arbitral right. Some scholars are worried
that the new law might be easily misused which, in turn, would deter
many foreign candidates that otherwise would have been appointed as
arbitrators.113 It is like a double-edged sword which might harm both the
state and the individual. With the belief that the rulers should try to avoid
employing the criminal law as much as possible, the criminal law remedy
can only be considered the last resort. Furthermore, the previous function
of criminal liability discussed above could be replaced by some other
means of social regulation such as a code of ethics and a civil liability of
arbitrators. Unfortunately, the new Chinese civil tradition and arbitration
experience do not yet provide a strong foundation for other non-criminal
means of controlling arbitrator misconduct.
With the new enactment, the task of ensuring arbitrator neutrality in
China presents a number of possible barriers in both perception and
reality. While a new crime has been articulated, its purported effect is
questionable if true enforcement is unavailable as what may constitute it
is very uncertain. On the contrary, the ambiguity of the provision will
undoubtedly impact arbitrators’ power of discretional evaluation of
evidence as well as offer the opportunity of misuse itself by the judicial
authority. That might infringe the legal rights and interests of the
arbitrator and the parties.
B. Proposals for Reform
The international community has been seeking a balance for years:
on the one hand, arbitrators should be required to assume liabilities —in
light of arbitral justice—for losses of parties incurred from their
deliberate or negligent misconduct in arbitration; on the other hand, to
realize the value of efficient arbitration, arbitrators should be warranted
certain immunity when performing their duties, which is necessary for
them to be free from improper interference and offence. How to keep the
balance depends not only on understanding the nature of arbitration and
the roles of arbitrators, but also of the current situation of development in
arbitration under a number of certain social conditions, such as social
identification of arbitration and the overall qualification of arbitrators.
Therefore, nations may set up institutions of arbitrator liability suitable
for their national conditions on the basis of jurisprudence for deference
to arbitration.
As outlined earlier, the newly established arbitrator criminal liability
regime in China is riddled with problems. The current regime can well be
described as a legislator-based system, characterized by paternalism and
rigidity. It appears that impartiality of arbitration and deference to
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arbitration are two conflicting values. This problem is particularly severe
and disconcerting in China. The simplistic approach of the new law
needs to be reformed because it is unable to achieve the goal of
impartiality of arbitrators. It is reasonable to expect that detailed rules
will emerge in the future, however, this does not suggest that China
should wholly abandon the use of the new law.
In discussing the reform of the regime, it is the author’s view that a
better method for realizing the goal is through a Judicial Interpretation of
the criminal statute. 114 Some U.S. experience has appeal and can be
borrowed in the context of China. In general, it must be kept in mind that
maintaining deference to arbitration is one of the most important
principles underlying judicial review of arbitration. The goal of Judicial
Interpretation is to design an effective mechanism to ensure fairness and
justice in the course of arbitration and at the same time preserve
deference to arbitration. Four aspects can be included.
1. Private Prosecution
In accordance with the current Chinese law, the crime of dereliction
of duty by state personnel who exercise public power on behalf of the
state is public prosecution. Since arbitration by “Perversion of Law” falls
within the scope of dereliction of duty, it is the Procuratorate, not the
claimant, who should bear the burden of proof. Whenever a “biased”
arbitrator is charged of “go[ing] against facts and law”, the Procuratorate
needs to examine the finding of the merits and the application of the law
in arbitration and prove the crime before the court. The court again has to
review issues like fact-finding and law application in determining what
might constitute the crime. The status of the arbitrator has become
weaker. It appears to be going farther away from the principle of
deference to arbitration. Previously, only procedural issues rather than
merits of international arbitration were allowed to be examined by the
courts. But the enactment broke the limit of the legislation because it
authorized both the courts and the Procuratorate the power of substantial
investigation over an arbitral award—which simply means a retrial. That
inquiry, however, is contrary to the finality of arbitration. The legislature
has put itself and the judicial authority into a dilemma: a review of the
merits of arbitration is in violation with China’s international convention
obligation whereas omission of criminal liability is against China’s
criminal law. The intervention of the public power with arbitration has
also been expanded, and the balance has been broken.
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To place an important check and balance, arbitration by “Perversion
of Law” would better be interpreted as private prosecution to shift the
burden of proof to the party who accuses the “biased” arbitrator of the
crime. The claimant, instead of the Procuratorate, should demonstrate the
partiality in the process of arbitration. A similar U.S. provision is “[a]
party seeking vacatur of an arbitration award on grounds of evident
partiality must demonstrate that a reasonable person would have to
conclude that an arbitrator was partial to the other party to the
arbitration.” With the restructuring of the procedure, the Procuratorate no
longer has the power to interfere with arbitration. The intervention of
public power with arbitration can be narrowed and the chances of misuse
of the criminal provision can be limited. The higher the threshold, the
more difficult the new law can be employed and the more protection
arbitration will get. When providing the elements which need to be taken
into account as evidences, the U.S. experience concerning the proof of
corruption, fraud, or other undue means can also be referenced. It seems
that arbitration could get sufficient protection while at the same time
necessary flexibility is preserved for deterring a biased arbitrator.
2. Criminal Liability only for the Neutral Arbitrator
The most popular method for appointing arbitrators to an arbitral
panel in international disputes is for each side to appoint one arbitrator,
with a third arbitrator appointed either by the two selected arbitrators or
by the arbitration association (or another appointing authority). 115 In
many jurisdictions, non-neutral arbitrators have long been considered
agents of the parties appointing them. In the United States, it is
acceptable that non-neutral arbitrators are not expected to be impartial
and only the neutral arbitrator is required to be “neutral”, as the term
suggests. The most important obligation of an arbitrator’s impartiality is
the duty to disclose information, especially the information concerning
peculiar interest or identity, which provides the market with an early
warning.
A significant issue that needs to be clarified is whether the nonneutral arbitrators assume the same penal liability as the neutral
arbitrator. In other words, where an arbitral award is rendered on the
basis of opinions of the majority or the neutral arbitrator, who, for
example, goes against the facts and the law, should the non-neutral
arbitrator or arbitrators who had different opinions be deemed as an
accomplice of the crime? Many people believe that non-neutral
arbitrators are just hired guns because being non-neutral makes these
arbitrators more attractive to certain parties. What they say should have
no more weight than the neutral arbitrator. Unfortunately, nothing in
current Chinese law provides either a distinction in liabilities among
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different arbitrators or a detailed working procedure of the new crime
concerning the disclosure duty.
It is improper to enact a statute without regard to the specific context
in which it is used. To ensure smoother transition and structural
adjustment, this author argues that attention should be paid to the
distinction of arbitrators in the panel, as they have different incentives in
arbitral proceedings. Exploration of incentives that make the arbitrator
free from partiality and exercise good faith and due diligence contributes
to our understanding of the roles of panel members in commercial
arbitration. There seems to be no good reason why all arbitrators should
be required to be identically impartial since they have varied ways of
appointment. Notably, some flexibility is necessary. A clarification
should be made in the future Judicial Interpretation that only the neutral
arbitrator should be criminally liable for arbitration by “Perversion of
Law.” This seemingly would have a positive impact, especially when
China is in a critical stage of encouraging the development of arbitration.
3. Civil Liability
It is presumed that parties to an arbitration agreement have agreed to
bear the risk of the arbitrator’s mistake in return for a quick, inexpensive,
and conclusive resolution to their dispute. The popularity of commercial
arbitration is that it brings the value of benefit and impartiality together.
As discussed earlier, arbitration historically has been a dispute resolution
mechanism for transactions that only implicate private law. 116 The
relationship between arbitrators and parties is more like a contract, and
an arbitrator should undertake the liability of breach of contract where he
acts partially. Consequently, arbitrator civil liability can be introduced
into the Chinese arbitration legal regime. This remedy cannot properly be
viewed as a white elephant from the uncertainties of the system, but as a
buffer.
4. Detailed Definitions
Without detailed rules, the criminal provision is of little practical
value. Besides what has been mentioned earlier, there are still many
vague terms which need to be carefully defined. In order to decide
whether the arbitrator has perverted the law or not, where an arbitral
award is rendered through mediation, neither a written mediation
statement nor a written arbitral award can be in compliance with the facts
and law.117 Suppose the law is not domestic law, the judicial authority
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has to prove first of all what the foreign law is and what its content and
legislative purposes are. Proof of foreign law is so complicated because
of different languages, understanding of laws, and notions of legislation.
More importantly, any decision concerning the interpretation of foreign
law by a Chinese court might constitute an infringement of foreign
sovereignty in violation of the basic principle of international law
because the foreign law is enacted and should only be interpreted by a
foreign authority. Chinese judicial organs’ inherited way of thinking in
terms of domestic law might bring about real “verdict by perversion of
law.” Furthermore, an arbitrator is criminally liable only when his or her
conduct is “intentional.” But what if the arbitrator’s liability of
“negligence” resulted from lack of professional care and due diligence?
In addition, the relation between the crime and the effectiveness of a
foreign arbitral award has not been provided. It is likely to have a
ridiculous concurrence that a foreign award which is rendered oversea by
a Chinese arbitrator has been recognized and enforced by a Chinese court
whereas the arbitrator is found guilty of this crime in China.
By carefully defining the conditions of the crime by listing some
specific situations, the future Judicial Interpretation can help make the
enactment more workable. The more detailed it is, the more authority the
enactment has. Taking into account the relationship between the spirit of
arbitration and the purpose of legislation in practice, the judicial
authority may start from the stance of deference to the contract nature of
arbitration and make some appropriate adjustments when interpreting the
law. For instance, the crime can be more restricted to domestic
arbitration than foreign and foreign-related arbitration; the “law” should
not include foreign law, because the criminal law is a public law and
should be strictly limited to a particular territory. Also, the nature of
arbitration requires more discretion than litigation, and the criterion of an
arbitrator’s “perversion of law” should be inferior to those of a judge, 118
so long as the award does not go against the fundamental principles of
civil and commercial law, such as party autonomy, good faith and public
policy, substantially, as well as equal hearing and admission of evidence
procedurally.
V. CONCLUSION
In the first five years, there have been no published instances in
which an arbitrator has been convicted under this provision. Records of
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prosecutions and convictions, however, are not public in China, so it is
difficult to confirm whether cases have, in fact, been brought. On the one
hand, the possibility of criminal conviction would presumably deter
biased arbitrators. While that is a net social good, there is another risk.
Prosecutorial abuse of the statute, by threatening to bring criminal
prosecution unless the arbitrator rules a certain way, could be a threat to
the independence of the arbitration process. The proponents of the new
provision argue that the justice of arbitration and protection of the rights
and interests of parties can be achieved in practice through the regulation
of arbitration with state interference, whereas its opponents are against
public intervention and believe that the previous goals can only be
realized through the development of arbitration itself.
The debate over the crime remains largely inconclusive, and so will
continue into the foreseeable future, as will the relevant empirical
studies. To create a better balance between arbitrator impartiality and
deference to arbitration, practice should have the final say on the effect
of the new provision. This, by its nature, reflects the different attitude
towards arbitration. The diversity of culture, tradition and condition
among different nations plays a very important role in the distinction of
policy adoption and law making in each nation. A dissimilar institution is
not simply a deviation from international practice. It also manifests a
diverse need at different stages of social development. Nations may take
specific measures in conformity with their own context to support
arbitration, so long as those measures, being deferential to an arbitral
award, are applied for the independence and protection of legal rights of
parties.
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